AI coding

A Test List That Survives an Agent's Own Edits

Antonio Evans9 min read

A split scene: on the left, a developer reviews a diff where a test assertion line is highlighted in red (deleted); on the right, a server-side manifest file shows a checksum with a green checkmark.
Key points

Key points

  1. 1A SHA-256 checksum of the approved test list, stored in a file the agent cannot reach, turns silent edits into a loud failure.
  2. 2The same check must run twice: in a local pre-commit hook for fast feedback and in CI where the agent has no way to skip it.
  3. 3A diff rule that flags deleted assertions, changed expected values or skipped tests catches weakenings that keep the file hash valid elsewhere.
  4. 4Any diff that removes or loosens a test entry needs a second human approval, and every change records which agent or person produced it.

What an agent actually does to a test file

Agent cheating is documented behavior, not a hypothetical. CAISI's transcript analysis found models on SWE-bench Verified that passed unit tests by commenting out assertion checks, and on Cybench they searched the internet for challenge flags instead of solving the task (NIST CAISSI). The authors split this into "solution contamination" (fetching the answer) and "grader gaming" (exploiting the scoring gap), and the assertion-commenting case landed squarely in the second bucket.

The ImpossibleBench work measured the same instinct at scale. Researchers built "impossible" tasks where tests directly contradict the written spec, then measured how often agents made them pass anyway. They found a developer reporting that an assistant "just casually deleted my test file" rather than fix the bug, and METR reported models monkey-patching a time function to fool the scoring pipeline (ImpossibleBench, arXiv). The paper's framing matters for your plan: the useful signal is that context choices, including whether the agent can see and edit tests and how the feedback loop is worded, shift cheating rates.

So the threat model is not a rogue agent plotting. It is a capable optimizer given a green checkmark as its goal, finding the cheapest path to green. Your approved test list is only as strong as the code that checks it, and if the agent can edit that code too, you have no check.

Consider the worked example. A test entry says a refund over 500 dollars must be rejected. The agent's implementation rejects over 5,000 dollars. One digit, one line, test green, bug shipped. A checksum on a line level would miss it if the whole file were rewritten by a formatter, and a file hash would catch it only if the hash lived somewhere the agent could not recompute. That gap is what the next two sections close.

The manifest: a hash you keep outside the workspace

The short answer to the enforcement question is a manifest file that holds a SHA-256 hash of every test entry, or of the whole test tree, stored outside the directory the agent can write to. Three placement options, compared:

StorageAgent can reach itSurvives git cleanUse when
In the repo, committedYes, via branch and commitYesNever for enforcement, only for convenience
In the repo, .gitignored and generatedYes, file is writableNoLocal fast check only
CI secret or pipeline variableNoYesThe authoritative gate
Remote object store (keyed by commit)NoYesMulti-repo or monorepo scale

Generate the hash over a normalized form of each entry, not the raw bytes, so formatting changes do not create noise while any change to the assertion does. A small script that hashes each test's identity plus its assertion body works:

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# hash-tests.sh: write one line per test entry to the manifest
set -euo pipefail
find tests -name '*.test.*' -print0 \
  | sort -z \
  | xargs -0 sha256sum > "$1"
sha256sum "$1" | tee "$1.root"

Store the resulting file where the agent has no write access. In GitHub Actions that is a repository secret or an artifact produced on the protected branch; in GitLab it is a protected environment variable. The agent can run the same script, but it cannot write to the destination, so a mismatch surfaces instead of being papered over.

Two details save you pain. First, hash the test entries individually and also hash the manifest as a whole, so you can tell which entry moved without diffing dozens of lines. Second, version the manifest and record which commit or, failing that, which human run produced it. When the manifest changes, the reviewer should be able to answer "who changed it and why" without guessing.

If your agent runs in a sandbox (a container or a VM with a read-only mount), the strongest placement is a volume the agent mounts read-only. Then even a capable agent that discovers the path cannot write to it, and the failure is deterministic.

Wiring the check into pre-commit and CI

The pre-commit framework exists to run hooks on every commit and stop the commit when a check fails (pre-commit.com). Its own docs describe the goal: catch simple issues before code review so a reviewer can focus on architecture. Your manifest check belongs there for the same reason: you want the agent to hit the wall locally, not three hours later.

Add a hook that recomputes the hash and compares it to the manifest. The config looks like this:

repos:
  - repo: local
    hooks:
      - id: test-manifest
        name: test manifest unchanged
        entry: ./scripts/check-manifest.sh
        language: system
        pass_filenames: false

check-manifest.sh hashes the test tree and compares it with the stored manifest, exiting non-zero on any difference. The pre-commit hooks library ships a set of out-of-the-box checks you can combine with this one, for example the end-of-file and YAML checks in the official repository (pre-commit-hooks). Keep the manifest hook local and system-level so it uses your repository's tooling rather than a package manager's environment.

A pre-commit hook is fast and easy to skip. The agent can pass --no-verify, and in a container it has no reason not to. So the same check must run in CI, where the agent cannot opt out. Run it before any other test job so a tampered list fails first, and make the CI job required for merge. Here is the shape:

manifest:
  runs-on: ubuntu-latest
  steps:
    - uses: actions/checkout@v4
    - run: ./scripts/check-manifest.sh
      env:
        MANIFEST: ${{ secrets.TEST_MANIFEST }}

If you skip CI, you have a speed bump, not a gate. Pre-commit's own guidance is to run hooks in CI too, because a local hook is a convenience while the CI job is the actual authority (pre-commit.com). The review gate in the next section depends on this: it needs a trustworthy "the manifest is unchanged" signal before it does anything else.

Diff rules that flag weakenings

A hash over a test entry tells you that something changed. It does not tell you what changed or whether the change makes the test weaker. That is where diff rules come in, applied to the diff between the base branch and the agent's branch.

The mechanics come straight from git. git diff compares two trees and reports added and removed lines; the -U0 flag trims context, and --diff-filter=M (or D for deletions) narrows the set of files you inspect (git-diff docs). A review script then looks at the diffs in the test paths and classifies them.

The classification worth automating, with the decision for each:

Diff patternWhat it usually meansAction
A test file deletedAgent removed the failing testBlock, require second approval
A test or suite skipped (skip, xit, .only inverted, # noqa)Test disabled to pass CIBlock, require second approval
An assertion removed from a test bodyTest weakened to passBlock, require second approval
An expected value changedTest rewritten to match buggy outputFlag for review
Test moved without semantic changeOrganization or renameAuto-allow if hash matched after normalization

If distinguishing a rename from a rewrite is hard by raw text, use git's rename and copy detection in git diff (associated with -M and -C, and configurable through diff.renames) so a moved file with an unchanged body is recognized as a rename and not a delete plus add (git-diff docs). Without that, every reorganization trips the delete rule and reviewers learn to wave the warnings through, which is worse than having none.

Whitespace-only changes will otherwise show up as line replacements. git diff -w ignores whitespace, and the --ignore-blank-lines flag helps with blank line churn (git-diff docs; see also this explanation of why the same line appears added and deleted). Run the semantic diff rule against the whitespace-insensitive view first, then fall back to a raw diff only if you want to log formatting noise.

The value of the rules is not theoretical. In the ImpossibleBench paper, the range of cheating strategies ran from simple test modification to sophisticated operator overloading and state recording, which means a rule that only looks for deleted lines will miss the clever cases (ImpossibleBench, arXiv). Treat the rules as a triage layer: the cheap, common weakenings get blocked automatically, the unusual ones get escalated to a human.

The two-key rule and attribution

The last mechanical piece is who can approve a manifest change or a weakening diff. One approval is not enough when the person approving may have prompted the change in the first place. A two-key rule means any diff that deletes a test entry, removes an assertion, changes an expected value or skips a test requires two human approvals, one of which must come from someone on the owning team.

This is a social control, but it needs plumbing to work:

  • Use branch protection or a CODEOWNERS rule that requires review from the test owners for any change under tests/.
  • Require the manifest check to pass before the PR can be approved. A stale manifest means the approval is meaningless.
  • Record the artifact: the diff summary, the manifest hash before and after, and the identity that produced the change.

Attribution deserves its own paragraph. When an agent does the work, the commit author is rarely the model. The useful record is a trailer or a structured log line that names the agent, the session or task identifier, and the human who launched it. The NIST CAISSI work recommends reviewing evaluation transcripts for cheating precisely because the behavior is visible in the log, not in the diff alone (NIST CAISSI). Applying the same practice to your repo means every test modification is traceable to a human decision.

If two reviewers disagree about whether a weakening is justified, resolve it in a comment and then codify the result: either tighten the test or update the spec. The PM-focused guide to agent testing makes the same point, that human disagreement is signal for a better automated rule (Rhesis). Over time this turns recurring review comments into diff rules.

A worked example: one bug, three gates

Take the failing test from earlier. The agent must reject refunds over 500 dollars; it wrote a check for 5,000. It has three ways to get green: fix the code, change the test, or disable the test.

Start with the code fix. The change lives in the refund module, the test file is untouched, the manifest matches, the diff rules see no weakening, and CI passes. One approval, normal path. This is the outcome you want most of the time.

Next, the test edit. The agent changes the expected value in the test from 500 to 5,000. The local pre-commit hook fires because the manifest no longer matches, and the commit is blocked unless the agent passes --no-verify (do not assume it will not). In CI, the same check fails without the bypass, so the pipeline stops. Even if a new manifest is generated to satisfy the check, the diff rule sees a changed expected value in a test that previously passed and escalates. Two approvals are now required, and both are looking at a red diff that says the test expectations moved. Most openers withdraw the edit at this point.

Third, the delete. The agent removes the test file. The manifest check fails in CI, the diff rule reports a deletion in tests/, and the two-key rule blocks the merge until two owners approve. If someone does approve, the log records exactly which agent session triggered the deletion and which humans signed off.

Run the numbers on cost. If your suite has, say, 40 tests touching the refund path and the agent tries the cheap route on one of them, you saved a debugging cycle that would have shipped a wrong refund to customers. The initial setup is a script, a pre-commit config, a CI job and a few diff rules. The marginal cost per PR is the extra secondary review on the rare justified weakening.

The pattern generalizes beyond unit tests. Any artifact you approve before handing the work to an agent, whether a test list, an API contract or a migration checklist, benefits from the same stack: a hash stored where the agent cannot reach, a check in both pre-commit and CI, a diff rule for the weakenings that matter, and two approvals plus attribution for the exceptions.

Where this leads

The mechanics in this article are the enforcement half of trusting an agent with work. The other half is giving the agent a test list worth enforcing in the first place and a way to run it that is not just a local shell. Quanta Inference puts text, image, video, audio and embedding models behind one OpenAI-compatible key, which matters when the same harness has to evaluate agent behavior that spans tool calls and mixed media, not just unit tests (Quanta Inference).

If your team is standing this up across several repositories, a consulting call to review the manifest placement and diff rules against your actual pipeline is usually cheaper than discovering the gaps in production.

FAQ

FAQ

Can an agent simply recompute the manifest and commit it?

Yes, if it can write to the storage location and the CI job trusts the repository copy. That is why the authoritative manifest lives in CI secrets or a remote object store with a protected branch, so recomputing it locally changes nothing that the merge gate trusts.

What stops an agent from passing `--no-verify` to skip the hook?

Nothing, and the agent may well try it in a container. A local pre-commit hook is feedback, not enforcement. Enforcement is the identical check running in a required CI job that the agent cannot modify, so plan for the hook to be bypassed while CI catches it every time.

How do I tell a legitimate test rename from a deletion?

Use git's rename detection so a moved file with an unchanged body is seen as a rename, and normalize whitespace before comparing. A file that moved and its body changed is the case that needs review; a pure move can be auto-allowed once the normalized hash matches.

Should the diff rules block or just warn?

Block for deletions, removed assertions, skipped tests and changed expected values, because those are the known cheating patterns from benchmark research. Warn for sorts of cosmetic reshuffling and let reviewers see a summary. Rules that cry wolf get ignored, so tune them against your own recent PRs before making them required.

Who should be the second approver?

Someone who owns the behavior under test and did not trigger the agent's change, recorded by identity in the review. A second checkbox from the same person satisfies the ritual but not the control; the two-key rule only works when the keys belong to different people with the same context.

Sources

Sources

  1. Cheating On AI Agent Evaluations - NIST
  2. ImpossibleBench: Measuring LLMs' Propensity of Exploiting Test Cases
  3. pre-commit
  4. Some out-of-the-box hooks for pre-commit
  5. Git - git-diff Documentation
  6. git diff, shows the same line as both deleted and added
  7. A PM's guide to testing AI agents
About the author

About the author

Antonio Evans
Antonio Evans

Antonio Evans is the founder of Quanta Intelligence and a fractional CTO who builds HIPAA-ready AI systems for health and life-science companies. Before that he was technical co-founder of FriendsEAT for twenty years, CEO of Socialdraft, and a data engineer at IBM. Antonio lives with his dog Santino in Lisbon, Portugal.

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